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A pin&a/  long-term  goai of Fedeai  Reserve monetary  poiky  is to restore  price stability 
to &  United States economy. In this arti&,  the author suggests  that a measure of th 
public?  inflation expectations  would assist  the Fed in attaining its goal and proposes 
that, to prwide  such a measure, the U.S.  Treasury issue bona%  indexed to eliminate 
loses resukng jivm  inflation. T/re article, which originally  appeared without  tk 
appendix in this Bank  1991  Annual  Report,  b  reprinted herv to stimul’ate  firther 
dkussion  of issues  related to the efort to eliminate  inflation. T/le v+ws expressed  are 
the author’s  and not necessariy those  of the Bank or the Federal Reserve System. 
Contracts  requiring  payment  of dollars  in the  future 
for future  delivery  of goods  and  services  are  a regular 
part  of economic  life.  Workers  enter  into  contracts, 
formal  and  informal,  for  a dollar  wage  for  the  next 
year.  Colleges  set  tuition  payments  once  a  year. 
Rents  for  apartments  are  set  annually  and 
homeowners  contract  for  mortgage  payments  in 
dollars.  The  purchasing  power  represented  by  these 
dollar  payments,  however,  depends  upon  the  rate  of 
inflation  realized  after  the  contracts  are  signed. 
People  must  forecast  inflation  in  order  to  estimate 
the  purchasing  power  of  future  dollar  payments. 
This  article  argues  that  it would  be  helpful  to  the- 
Federal  Reserve  System  to  have  a measure  of  the 
public’s  inflation  forecast.  The  Fed,  through  its con- 
trol  of  the  money  stock,  controls  the  long-run  rate 
of inflation.  There  is, however,  always  considerable 
short-run  uncertainty  regarding  the  way  in  which 
changes  in  its  policy  instrument  (reserves  or  the 
federal  funds  rate)  will ultimately  affect  money  growth 
and  inflation.  A measure  of the  inflation  forecast  by 
the  public  would  offer  the  Fed  a  useful  “outside” 
assessment  of the  inflationary  consequences  thought 
likely  to follow  from  its policy  actions.  This  inflation 
forecast  could  be  inferred  from  the  yield  gap between 
the  interest  rates  paid  on  conventional  bonds  and  on 
bonds  indexed  to  the  price  level.’  Unfortunately, 
indexed  bonds  are  not  now  traded  in  the  United 
States.  This  paper  proposes  that  the  U.S.  Treasury 
issue  indexed  bonds  to  create  a  measure  of  the 
public’s  inflation  forecast. 
THEPROPOSAL 
A measure  of the  inflation  expected  by  the  public 
could  be  created  by legislation  requiring  the  Treasury 
to ,issue  zero-coupon  bonds  with  maturities  of  one 
year,  two  years,  and  so  on  out  to  twenty  years.  A 
zero-coupon  bond  is a promise  to make  a future  one- 
time  payment.  Zero-coupon  bonds  sell at a discount 
and yield  a return  through  capital  appreciation.  Under 
the  proposal,  half  the  bonds  issued  would  be  con- 
ventional  (nonindexed)  zero-coupon  bonds  that 
would  offer  a  principal  payment  of  a  given  dollar 
amount.  The  other  half  would  offer  a  principal 
payment  in  dollars  of  constant  purchasing  power 
achieved.  by  indexing  the  principal  payment  to  the 
price  level.  For  example,  if the  principal  payment 
of the  conventional  zero-coupon  bond  were  $100  and 
the  price  level  were  to  rise  by  5 percent  in the  year 
after  the  sale  of  the  bonds,  an  indexed  bond  with 
a  maturity  of  one  year  would  pay  $lOS.* 
Holders  of  indexed  bonds  do  not  have  to  worry 
about  the  depreciation  of  the  dollars  in which  they 
are paid.  For  a zero-coupon  bond  sold  in, say,  1992, 
both  the  amount  bid  and  the  purchasing  power  af- 
forded  by  the  principal  payment  are  measured  in 
1992  dollars.  The  discount  on  the  bond,  therefore, 
is  a measure  of  the  real  yield  (real  capital  appreci- 
ation)  offered  by  the  bond  over  its  life.  The  yield 
on  indexed  bonds  would  offer  a direct  measure  of 
the  real  (inflation-adjusted)  rate  of interest.  Further- 
more,  the  existence  of  indexed  bonds  of  different 
maturities  would  provide  a measure  of the  term  struc- 
ture  of  real  rates  of  interest.3 
Because  holders  of  the  indexed  bonds  are  guar- 
anteed  payment  representing  a  known  amount  of 
purchasing  power,  they  do  not  have  to  forecast 
inflation.  In  contrast,  holders  of  the  nonindexed 
bonds  would have  to  forecast  future  changes  in the 
value  of  the  dollar.  Consequently,  the  yield  on  the 
nonindexed  bonds  would  incorporate  an  inflation 
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expected  depreciation  in the  pur- 
chasing  power  of the  dollar,  and 
the  difference  in yields  between 
the  nonindexed  and  indexed 
bonds,  therefore,  would  measure 
the  inflation  expected  by  in- 
vestors  over  the  life of the  bond. 
The  existence  of, bonds  of  dif- 
ferent  maturities  would  offer  a 
term  structure  of expected  future 
inflation.  Given  the  current  price 
level,  this  term  structure  would 
yield  a time  profile  of the  future 
price  level  expected  by  the 
public. 
Figure  1  illustrates  a  hypo- 
thetical  example  in  which  the 
public  expects  future  inflation  to 
remain  steady  at 4 percent  a year. 
(The  contemporaneous  price 
level  is also taken  to  be  138,  the 
current  value  of  the  CPI.)  If 
nonindexed  and  indexed  zero- 
coupon  bonds  are  issued  at  ma- 
Figure  1 
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Note:  Hvwthetical  observations  are  based  on  assumed  4  percent  rate  of  , 
inflation. 
turities  ranging  from  one  year  to  twenty  years,  the  level  and  a target  path  for  the  price  level.  Because 
yield gap on successive  issues would  permit  inference  individual  policy  actions  affect  prices  only  with  long 
of a term  structure  of future  inflation.  These  yearly  lags,  however,  such  a straightforward  strategy  could 
expected  inflation  rates,  when  applied  to the  current  be  destabilizing.  In practice,  the  Fed  monitors  indi- 
price  level,  would  allow construction  of the  time  pro-  cator  variables  to  determine  whether  the  changes  in 
file of the  future  price  level  expected  by  the  public  its  policy  instrument  are  consistent  with  the  infla- 
shown  in  Figure  1.  tion  rate  it  considers  acceptable. 
Consider  an  indexed  one-year-maturity  zero- 
coupon  bond  that  is a promise  to  pay  $100  in  one 
year,  with  the  $100  indexed  to  the  consumer  price 
index.  If the  real rate  of interest  were  3 percent,  the 
bond  would  sell for $97.  If the  public  believed  that 
the  one-year  inflation  rate  would  be  4  percent,  a 
comparable  nonindexed  bond  would  sell  for  $93, 
returning  4 percent  in compensation  for the  expected 
inflation  and  a 3  percent  expected  real  yield.  The 
interest  rate  on  the  nonindexed  bond  would  then  be 
7 percent,  with  a 3 percent  real  interest  rate  on  the 
indexed  bond.  The  “yield  gap”  between  these  two 
rates  is the  4 percent  inflation  rate  expected  by  the 
market. 
Some  economists  have  suggested  that  the  Fed 
change  its  policy  instrument  in  response  to 
movements  in  the  prices  of  actively  traded  com- 
modities.  These  prices  do move  freely  in response 
to  changes  in  expenditure  produced  by  monetary 
policy  actions;  however,  they  often  move  in response 
to market-specific  disturbances.  At such  times,  com- 
modity  prices  might  give misleading  signals about  the 
thrust  of  monetary  policy. 
THEYIELDGAPASANINDICATOR 
OFMONE~TARYPOLICY 
In order  to achieve  its inflation  objective,  the  Fed 
could,  in principle,  change  its  policy  instrument  in 
response  to  discrepancies  between  the  actual  price 
Milton  Friedman  has long  advocated  a low,  stable 
rate  of growth  of M2  as the  guide  to monetary  policy. 
M2  has  maintained  a  reliable  relationship  to  the 
public’s  dollar  expenditure  over  long periods  of time. 
In fact,  the  ratio  of dollar  GNP  to M2,  known  as M2 
velocity,  is currently  about  1.63,  little  changed  from 
its  value  in  1914  when  the  Federal  Reserve  was 
founded.  Over  periods  of  time  as  long  as  several 
years,  however,  M2  velocity  fluctuates  signifi- 
cantly.  Many  economists  also  fear  that  future  finan- 
cial innovation  could  alter  the  long-run  relationship 
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sus  will  never  emerge  that  a  particular  monetary 
aggregate  is  a  reliable  indicator  of  the  stance  of 
monetary  policy. 
In  contrast  to  these  alternatives,  the  yield  gap 
between  nonindexed  and  indexed  bonds  would 
offer  a  direct  measure  of  expected  inflation.  This 
measure  would  offer useful  information  to monetary 
policymakers  because  it would  be formed  by market 
participants  who  have  a  direct  financial  interest  in 
forecasting  inflation. 
AVOIDING  INFLATION AND DISINFLATION 
The  lag between  changes  in the  Federal  Reserve’s 
policy  instrument  and  changes  in prices  means  that 
it is difficult to associate  particular  policy  actions  with 
inflation.  This  difficulty  lowers  the  cost  of exerting 
political  pressure  for an inflationary  policy;  moreover, 
the  quicker  impact  of  stimulative  monetary  policy 
on  output  than  on prices  generates  political  pressure 
to trade  off immediate  output  gains against  a delayed 
rise  in inflation.  Indexed  bonds  of the  sort  proposed 
here  would  balance  these  pressures  by  threatening 
an immediate  rise  in the  yield  gap  between  indexed 
and  nonindexed  bonds.  The  Fed  would  have  a clear 
and  more  immediate  justification  for  resisting  infla- 
tionary  pressures. 
Further,  with  indexed  bonds,  public  pressure  for 
an  inflationary  monetary  policy  that  was  associated 
with  a rise  in  the  yield  gap  in  itself  would  produce 
countervailing  pressure.  Holders  of  nonindexed 
bonds  would  suffer  a capital  loss when  the  yield  gap 
rose.  All creditors  receiving  payment  in nonindexed 
dollars  in the  future  would  feel  worse  off. The  yield 
gap would  restrain  pressure  for inflationary  policy  by 
offering  an immediate  and continuous  market  assess- 
ment  of  the  potential  impact  of  such  a policy. 
Surprise  inflation  acts  like  a capital  levy  imposed 
on money  and government  securities.  The  essentially 
fiscal transfer  that  arises  from  surprise  inflation  does 
not  have  to be legislated  explicitly.  Federal  Reserve 
independence  is designed  to prevent  monetary  policy 
from  becoming  the  handmaiden  of  fiscal  policy. 
Institutional  arrangements,  like  the  federal  structure 
of the  Fed  with  its regional  bank  presidents  and long 
terms  for members  of the  Board  of Governors,  give 
substance  to  central  bank  independence.  The  con- 
tinuous  market  assessment  of  the  level  of  future 
inflation offered  by the yield gap between  nonindexed 
and  indexed  bonds  would  constitute  an  additional 
safeguard  against  surprise  inflation. 
POSSIBLE DISTORTIONS IN THE YIELD  GAP 
The  information  on  expected  inflation  offered  by 
the yield gap between  nonindexed  and indexed  bonds 
of equal  maturities  would  be  diminished  if the  gap 
fluctuated  in  response  to  tax  and/or  risk  premium 
factors.  These  possibilities  are  considered  in  turn. 
Tax  Distortions 
Ideally,  for  both  the  nonindexed  bond  and  the 
indexed  bond,  income  subject  to  taxation  would  be 
indexed  for inflation.  That  is,  holders  of both  types 
of bonds  would  pay  taxes  only  on the  increase  in pur- 
chasing  power  gained  from  holding  the  bonds,  rather 
than  on  any  increase  in the  dollar  value  of the  bond 
that  only  compensates  for  inflation. 
In  order  to  illustrate  this  point,  consider  the 
following  hypothetical  example.  Suppose  that,  for 
both  the  indexed  and  nonindexed  bonds,  only  the 
return  that  represents  a gain  in purchasing  power  is 
taxed.  As before,  if the  real  rate  of return  is 3 per- 
cent,  an  indexed  bond  that  promises  to  pay  $100 
of  constant  purchasing  power  next  year  would  sell 
for  $97  in the  current  year.  If,  subsequently,  infla- 
tion  turns  out  to  be  4  percent,  the  holder  of  the 
indexed  bond  will  receive  $104.  In  this  case,  tax- 
able  income  would  be  calculated  as  the  $7  in total 
income  minus  the  $4  inflation  adjustment,  which  is 
a capital  depreciation  allowance  to maintain  the  pur- 
chasing  power  of the  investor’s  capital.  The  holder 
of the  nonindexed bond  also  would  be  taxed  only  on 
the  real  portion  of  the  bond’s  yield.4 
If, alternatively,  taxable  income  were  not  indexed 
for  inflation,  an  increase  in the  inflation  rate  would 
increase  the  taxes  paid  by  the  holders  of  indexed 
bonds,  which  would  reduce  the  real  after-tax  yield 
on  the  bonds  even  if there  had  been  no  reduction 
in the  real before-tax  yield.  Unless  the  tax code  were 
indexed,  the  yield  on  the  indexed  bond  would  rise 
as  inflation  rose  to  compensate  for  the  increase  in 
taxes  imposed  by  higher  inflation.  The  yield  on  the 
indexed  bond  would  then  offer  a distorted  measure 
of the  economy-wide  real  rate  of interest.  With  the 
relatively  moderate  levels  of inflation  experienced  in 
the  198Os,  however,  the  distortions  caused  by  the 
present  absence  of inflation  indexing  in the  tax code 
would  not greatly  impair  the usefulness  of the indexed 
bond  as  a  measure  of  the  real  rate  of  interest. 
Moreover,  if the  tax  treatment  for  the  nonindexed 
and indexed  bond  were  the  same,  information  about 
expected  inflation  contained  in the yield gap between 
the  nonindexed  and  indexed  bond  would  not  be 
distorted  by  changes  in  the  rate  of  inflation. 
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Because  the  public  might  be  willing  to  pay 
something  to  hold  an asset  whose  value  is not  arbi- 
trarily  affected  by  unanticipated  inflation,  it  is 
possible  that  a risk premium  might  bias the yield  gap 
upward.  The  yield gap would  then  overstate  expected 
inflation.  Also,  the  risk  premium  could  vary  so that 
the  yield  gap  would  change  even  with  no  change  in 
expected  inflation.  (Note  that  if  the  yield  gap 
incorporated  a  risk  premium,  the  Treasury  would 
have  to  compensate  investors  for  the  inflation  risk 
entailed  by  holding  its  nonindexed  bonds.  Indexed 
bonds  would  not  carry  this  cost.) 
Whether  a risk  premium  would,  in fact,  be  incor- 
porated  in the yield gap is of course  an empirical  ques- 
tion.  Woodward  (1990)  examined  the behavior  of the 
yield  gap  between  nonindexed  and  indexed  British 
bonds  and  concluded  that  any  risk  premium  must 
have  been  very  small.5 If the  risk premium  had  been 
significant,  the  yield  gap  between  conventional  and 
indexed  bonds  would  have  implied  implausibly  low 
estimates  of  expected  inflation  for  Britain  for  the 
1980s.  Furthermore,  Woodward’s  measure  of  real 
yields  (adjusted  for  preferential  tax  treatment  of 
indexed  bonds)  produces  surprisingly  high  values. 
Because  real  yields  averaged  around  5.5  percent,  it 
is  implausible  that  holders  of  indexed  bonds  were 
foregoing  much  yield  as protection  against  surprise 
inflation.  (See  Figure  2.) 
The  magnitude  of a possible  risk 
premium  also  would  depend  upon 
monetary  policy.  Suppose  that  the 
central  bank  had  made  a  credible 
commitment  to price  stability.  With 
such  a policy,  random  shocks  would 
still  cause  the  central  bank  to  miss 
its  price  level  target,  but  these 
misses  subsequently  would  be  off- 
set.  Consequently,  the  price  level 
would  fluctuate  around  a fKed  value, 
and the  magnitude  of any  discrepan- 
cy  between  yields  of  nonindexed 
and  indexed  bonds  due  to  a  risk 
premium  would  decline  as maturities 
lengthened. 
Alternatively,  suppose  that  the 
central  bank  allowed  contempora- 
neous  price  level  shocks  to be incor- 
porated  permanently  in  the  future 
price  level target.  Consequently,  the 
price  level  would  wander  randomly 
16 
over  time.  (The  central  bank  could  allow  this  kind 
of  price-level  drift  even  if  it  did  not  introduce  a 
systematic  bias  in favor  of inflation.)  The  difficulty 
in predicting  the  real purchasing  power  of a promise 
to  pay  a fixed  dollar  amount  in the  future  would  in- 
crease  as  the  time  horizon  lengthened.  With  this 
policy,  the  magnitude  of  any  discrepancy  between 
yields  of nonindexed  and indexed  bonds  due to a risk 
premium  would  not  decline  as maturities  lengthened. 
Even  if  the  yield  gap  between  nonindexed  and 
indexed  bonds  were  to  incorporate  a risk  premium, 
changes  in  the  yield  gap  would  still  convey  impor- 
tant  information  to the  central  bank.  Increases  in the 
yield  gap  would  be  of  concern  to  the  central  bank 
even  if they  were  caused  by  an  increase  in the  risk 
premium,  rather  than  by  an  increase  in  expected 
inflation.  A  central  bank  must  assure  markets  that 
its  independence  is  a  safeguard  against  surprise 
inflation.  An increase  in the  size of the  risk premium 
caused  by  increased  concern  for  surprise  future 
inflation  would  indicate  to  the  central  bank  a need 
to  reinforce  the  credibility  of  its  commitment  to 
monetary  stability. 
ISSUES  FOR DEBT MANAGEMENT 
The  idea  of  indexed  bonds  has  been  advanced 
numerous  times  in the  past.  The  Treasury  possesses 
the  authority  to issue  indexed  bonds,  but  has  always 
resisted  doing  so.  In  congressional  hearings  on 
Figure  2 
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Note:  Monthly  observations  of  yields  on  indexed  bonds  issued  in  April  1982  and  maturing 
in  August  2011  and  of  yields  on  conventional  bonds  maturing  in  August  2011.  Data 
were  furnished  by  C.  Thomas  Woodward. 
ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1992 indexed  bonds  (U.S.  Congress,  1985),  Francis 
Cavanaugh,  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Govern- 
ment  Finance  and Market  Analysis  of the  Treasury, 
detailed  the  reasons. 
Mr.  Cavanaugh  argued  that  the  Treasury  did  not 
know  whether  anyone  would  buy  indexed  bonds.6 
If  there  were  no  demand  for  them,  their  issuance 
would  increase  the  Treasury’s  cost  of  funding  the 
government’s  debt. 
.  .  .  we  have  yet  to  see  any  strong  evidence  of 
potential  demand  for such an indexed  bond  in this 
country.  . . . An indexed bond,  because  of its novel 
features,  would  not  realize the  full benefits  of the 
liquidity of the  conventional  Treasury  market,  and 
its relative lack of liquidity would be reflected  in the 
bid  price  received  by  the  Treasury  in an  indexed 
bond auction.  . . . Thus  a requirement  that the U.S. 
Treasury  issue  indexed  bonds,  especially  fixed 
amounts  each  year,  could  lead  to  significant  in- 
creases  in  the  cost  of  financing  the  public  debt 
(U.S.  Congress,  pp.  17 and  20).7 
According  to  this  argument,  there  is uncertainty 
over  whether  anyone  would  value  the  inflation  pro- 
tection  offered  by  indexing.  Because  inaccurate 
inflation  forecasts  are  costly,  however,  it  seems 
implausible  that  no savers would  be interested  in pro- 
tecting  against  such  risk.  Consider,  for example,  the 
experience  of  someone  who  bought  and  held  a 
30-year  government  bond  30 years  ago.  In  196 1, the 
long-term  government  bond  yield  was  3.9  percent. 
On  average,  over  the  three  years  1959,  1960,  and 
1961,  CPI  inflation  averaged  1.1  percent.  Assum- 
ing,  given  this  experience,  that  in  1961  investors 
believed  that  the  long-term  rate  of  inflation  would 
be  1.1 percent,  a purchaser  of a 30-year  bond  would 
have  anticipated  a yearly  gain  in  real  terms  of  2.8 
percent  (3.9 percent  minus  1.1 percent).  In fact,  over 
the  30-year  period  from  196 1 to  199 1, CPI  inflation 
averaged  5.2  percent.  The  investor  lost  1.3 percent 
of his  capital  each  year  (3.9  percent  minus  5.2  per- 
cent)  because  of  inflation  (not  counting  taxes  paid 
on  coupon  payments).  Instead  of a 30  percent  gain 
in  capital  from  holding  the  bond  for  30  years,  the 
investor  lost  30  percent  of his  capital.  Munnell  and 
Grolnic  (1986)  make  a  persuasive  case  that,  at  a 
minimum,  pension  funds  and  holders  of IRAs  would 
be  interested  in  indexed  bonds.8 
BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
British  Indexed  Gilts 
Britain  has  issued  indexed  bonds  (gilts)  since 
1981.  Unfortunately,  indexing  in  Britain  is  poorly 
designed  for  measuring  expected  inflation.  British 
bonds  are  indexed  to  the  retail  price  index  (RPI), 
which  is  a poor  measure  of  inflation  because  it  in- 
cludes  the  cost  of mortgage  interest  payments.  Also, 
coupon  and  principal  payments  are indexed  with  an 
eight-month  lag.9 This  eight-month  lag  makes  real 
yields  on indexed  bonds  with  a maturity  even  as long 
as five years  sensitive  to  variations  in inflation.  The 
difference  between  yields  on nonindexed  and indexed 
bonds,  therefore,  cannot  reliably  be used  to measure 
expected  inflation  over  periods  as  short  as  a  few 
years. 
The  practice  of  issuing  only  long-term  indexed 
bonds  compounds  the  difficulty  of  measuring  the 
public’s  expected  inflation  over  periods  as  short  as 
a few years.  In order  to observe  a yield  gap on bonds 
of  short  maturity,  it  is  necessary  to  wait  until  the 
passage  of time  reduces  the  maturity  of the  long-term 
bonds.  Even  though  indexed  bonds  were  first issued 
in  198 1, there  is still a paucity  of indexed  bonds  with 
a short  period  to  maturity.  As  of the  end  of  1990, 
the  average  maturity  of indexed  bonds  outstanding 
was  18.9  years.  There  were  only  21.05  billion  of 
indexed  securities  outstanding  with  maturities  of five 
years  or  less.  Also,  for  short-term  maturities,  the 
absence  of nonindexed  bonds  with  exactly  the  same 
maturity  as  indexed  bonds  becomes  more  of  a 
problem. 
In a personal  communication  with  the  author,  Alan 
Walters  noted  that  in  Britain  the  Exchequer  varied 
the  relative  supplies  of nonindexed  short-term  debt 
and long-term  indexed  bonds  in response  to changes 
in the  yield  gap  between  the  two  kinds  of debt.  In 
order  to  ensure  that  the  yield  gap  reflects  expecta- 
tions  of  inflation,  rather  than  relative  supplies,  he 
recommended  that  in  the  future  indexed  and  non- 
indexed  debt  be  issued  in  fixed  proportions.iO 
British  Monetary  Policy 
The  usefulness  of  a  yield  gap  between  nonin- 
dexed  and  indexed  bonds  as a measure  of expected 
inflation  has  been  questioned  on  the  basis  of  the 
British  experience.  In an article  in the Financial  Times 
(April 29,  1991),  Anthony  Harris  stated  that  the  “gap 
has  tracked  current  inflation  faithfully,  but  has  no 
forecasting  value  at  all.  .  .  . The  market  forecasts 
the  way  a picnicker  does-by  looking  out  of the  win- 
dow.”  Therefore,  he  concludes,  the  nonindexed- 
indexed  bond  gap  cannot  “give  a valuable  steer  on 
monetary  policy.”  Presumably,  Mr.  Harris  has  in 
mind  the  failure  of  the  yield  gap  to  predict  the 
increase  in inflation  that  occurred  in  1988.  A  brief 
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proves  to be helpful in understanding  Mr.  Harris’ con- 
tention  that  bond  markets  are  not  forward-looking. 
In  Britain,  inflation  fell  from  20  percent  in  1980 
to an average  of about  3.5  percent  in  1986 and  1987. 
(Figures  for  inflation  are  for  the  RPI  excluding 
mortgage  interest  payments.)  Until  1988,  actual 
inflation moved  fairly closely  with long-term  expected 
inflation,  inferred  from  the  yield  gap  between  the 
indexed  bond  issued  in  1982  and  maturing  in 2006 
and a conventional  bond  with  approximately  the  same 
maturity.”  (See  Figure  3.)  Over  1986  and  1987,  in 
particular,  the  yield  gap  averaged  about  3.5  percent. 
Actual  inflation  began  to  rise  in  early  1988  and 
peaked  in  1990  somewhat  above  9  percent.  The 
yield-gap  measure  of  expected  inflation  did  rise 
steadily  with  actual  inflation  in  early  1988,  but 
reached  a  peak  of  only  about  6  percent  in  early 
1990. 
What  caused  the  sharp  rise in inflation,  which  was 
understated  by  the  yield  gap?  After  the  Louvre 
Accord  on  February  3,  1987,  Nigel  Lawson, 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  began  to  peg  the 
DMIZ  exchange  rate informally  at 3 to  1. At the  same 
time,  the  real  terms  of  trade  began  to  appreciate 
steadily  in  Britain’s  favor.  That  is,  British  physical 
assets  and commodities  became  more  attractive.  This 
appreciation  was  prompted  by  three  factors.  First, 
the  Conservative  electoral  victory  in  1987  made 
Britain  appear  to  be  a safe  haven  for foreign  capital. 
Second,  the  rise  in  the  price  of  oil  after  its  1986 
trough  and  a  large  oil  discovery  announced  on 
March  8,  1988,  raised  the  value  of British  exports. 
Finally,  the  reduction  in  marginal  tax  rates,  an- 
nounced  March  15,  1988,  increased  the  attractive- 
ness  of  investment  in  Britain  and  reduced  capital 
outflows. 
With  a pegged  exchange  rate,  the  appreciation  in 
the  real  terms  of trade  appeared  as  a rise  in British 
prices,  which  was  accommodated  by  high  money 
growth.  Growth  in  the  monetary  base  went  from 
about  4 percent  in the  middle  of  1987  to  more  than 
10  percent  toward  the  end  of  1988.  In  the  spring 
of  1988,  Mr.  Lawson  allowed  the  DM/%  exchange 
rate  to  rise,  but  only  grudgingly.  To  retard  the 
pound’s  appreciation,  he lowered  the  UK bank  base 
lending  rate  to  a low  of  7.5  percent  in  May  1988, 
from a high of 11 percent  in early  1987.  In June  1988, 
in response  to the  sustained  rise in inflation that  began 
in early  1988,  Mr.  Lawson  reversed  course  and began 
to  raise  the  base  rate,  which  reached  15 percent  in 
October  1989. 
In  light  of  this  experience,  were  the  holders  of 
British  bonds  making  forward-looking  predictions  of 
inflation?  In  1987,  the  holders  of bonds  maturing  in 
2006  were  predicting  inflation  of somewhat  less than 
Figure  3 
ACTUAL  AND  EXPECTED  INFLATION  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Annual Percentage  Change 
0  1  1  I  I  I  I  1  I  I  I  I  1  I  ,  I  I  I  I  I  !  1  I  I 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
Note:  Actual  inflation  is  the  annual  percentage  change  in  the  RPI  excluding  mortgage  interest  payments  over  the  preceding  12-month  period.  Expected 
inflation  is  inferred  from  the  yield  gap  between  an  indexed  bond  maturing  in  2006  and  a  conventional  bond  with  approximately  the  same  maturity. 
The  yield  gap  was  adjusted  for  different  tax  treatment  in  the  two  bonds.  The  expected  inflation  series  was  supplied  by  C.  Thomas  Woodward. 
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tion  be  defended  as  forward-looking  in  light  of  the 
increase  in British  inflation  from  somewhat  less  than 
4 percent  in 1988 to almost  10 percent  in 1990? With 
the  pound  pegged  to the  mark,  British  inflation  must 
equal  German  inflation  plus  whatever  appreciation 
(or minus  whatever  depreciation)  occurs  in the  terms 
of  trade.  Historically,  German  inflation  has  varied 
around  3 to 4 percent.  If changes  in the  terms  of trade 
are  inherently  unpredictable,  then  a  prediction  of 
inflation of 3 to 4 percent  was a reasonable  estimate.r2 
Ex  post,  predicted  inflation  in the  3- to  4-percent 
range  now  appears  to  have  been  reasonable.  Since 
Britain’s  formal  entry  into  the  EMS  in  the  autumn 
of  1990,  the  DMlC  exchange  rate  has  stayed  very 
close  to  3 to  1. With  the  cessation  in the  apprecia- 
tion  in the  British  terms  of trade,  British  inflation  had 
to  fall to  the  German  level.  By autumn  1991,  it had 
been  brought  roughly  into  line  with  German  infla- 
tion  of about  4 percent.  r3 In  short,  there  is nothing 
in the  British experience  to indicate  that  bondholders 
are  not  forward-looking. 
Can  Bond  Markets  Predict  Inflation? 
On  the  basis  of  an  examination  of  the  British 
experience,  Gabriel  de  Kock  (199 1) concludes  that 
using  a yield  gap  to  measure  expected  inflation  as 
proposed  here  would  not  be  useful  to  the  Fed. 
Based  on the  British experience,  he makes  two  asser- 
tions.  First,  he  asserts  that  the  yield  on  the  indexed 
bond  does  not  offer a measure  of the  economy’s  real 
yield.  Second,  he claims  that  the  yield  gap  between 
nonindexed  and  indexed  bonds  possesses  no  pre- 
dictive  power  for  future  inflation  beyond  what  is 
furnished  by  recent,  actual  inflation.  The  empirical 
tests  De  Kock  conducts,  however,  are  not  capable 
of  proving  or  disproving  these  assertions.14 
De  Kock  tests  whether  the  yield  gap  predicts 
subsequent  inflation  rates  over  12-,  24-,  and  36- 
month  periods,  respectively.  Apparently,  he chooses 
these  rates  because  they  are  of  “primary  concern 
to  policymakers.”  They  were  not,  however,  what 
bondholders  were  trying  to  predict.  The  author 
derives  his measure  of expected  inflation  from  com- 
paring  the  yield  on  nonindexed  bonds  with  the  yield 
of indexed  bonds  of roughly  the  same  maturity  issued 
in March  1982  and  maturing  in July  1996.  For  ex- 
ample,  the  first  observation  used  by  the  author  is 
dated  March  1982.  The  yield  gap  between  nonin- 
dexed  and  indexed  bonds  then  reflects  the  market’s 
expectation  of  inflation  from  March  1982  to  July 
1996.  The  author  compares  this  expectation  of 
inflation  with  actual  inflation  over  the  much  shorter 
periods  beginning  in  March  1982  and  ending  in 
March  1983,  March  1984,  and March  1985.  In order 
to perform  the kind of ex post  test  of predictive  power 
the  author  wishes  to  conduct,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  wait  until  1996  (or  close  to  that  date).rs 
Despite  the  inability  of  De  Kock’s  tests  to  bring 
evidence  to bear  on  the  ex post  predictive  accuracy 
of the  yield  gap  as a measure  of expected  inflation, 
his  work  does  raise  the  interesting  question  of how 
to  interpret  evidence  on ex post  predictive  accuracy. 
Would  evidence  that  investors  predict  inflation poorly 
affect  the  value  to  the  central  bank  of  a yield-gap 
measure  of  expected  inflation?  The  answer  would 
appear  to  be  no.  What  matters  in  determining  the 
real  rate  of  interest  is  what  inflation  rate  financial 
markets  expect,  not  whether  ex post  they  predicted 
inflation  accurately.  Moreover,  evidence  from  a yield- 
gap measure  of expected  inflation  demonstrating  that 
the  public  in practice  predicts  inflation  poorly  would 
provide  an  incentive  to  the  central  bank  to  alter 
monetary  policy  to  ensure  that  at  least  in  the  long 
term  the  price  level  would  be  easy  to  predict. 
SIJMMARYANDCONCLUDINGCOMMENTS 
The  yield-gap  proposal  advanced  here  differs from 
earlier  proposals  for indexed  bonds  in its recommen- 
dation  that  (1)  equal  amounts  of  nonindexed  and 
indexed  bonds  of the  same  maturity  be  issued  and 
(2)  the  resulting  yield  gap  be  used  as  an  indicator 
of  whether  particular  monetary  policy  actions  are 
consistent  with  the  Federal  Reserve’s  inflation 
objective.  l6 
The  Federal  Reserve  determines  the long-term  rate 
of inflation.  The  measure  of expected  inflation  pro- 
posed  here  would  allow the  Fed  to observe  whether 
there  was  a  discrepancy  between  the  rate  of  infla- 
tion  expected  by  the  public  and  the  rate  of inflation 
it  seeks  to  achieve.  Monetary  policymakers  would 
then  be  in a better  position  to  make  policy  in a way 
that  avoids  discrepancies  between  expected  and 
subsequently  realized  inflation.  The  yield-gap 
measure  of expected  inflation  would  allow monetary 
policy  to be evaluated  on whether  or not  it provides 
a  stable  monetary  environment  characterized  by 
moderate  fluctuations  in expected  inflation  and  the 
absence  of inflationary  and  disinflationary  surprises. 
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Using  Indexed  Bonds  in  Making  Monetary  Policy:  An  Illustration 
At  present,  the  Fed  must  infer  how  its  actions 
affect the  public’s perception  of the  inflation  rate  that 
it, the  Fed,  considers  acceptable.  The  Fed  becomes 
concerned  when  financial  markets  appear  to  inter- 
pret  a policy  action  as signaling  a willingness  on  its 
part  to  tolerate  a higher  inflation  rate.  A  yield  gap 
indicator  would  allow the  Fed  to observe  directly  how 
it is influencing  the  public’s  expectation  of inflation. 
The  example  below  illustrates  this  point. 
Figure  1 displays  hypothetical  time  profiles  of the 
public’s  expectation  of  the  future  price  level  as  in- 
ferred  from  the  yield  gap  between  nonindexed  and 
indexed  bonds  of  successively  longer  maturity.  To 
simplify  the  discussion,  I  assume  initially  that  the 
public  believes  the  Fed  will  maintain  the  rate  of 
inflation  at  0 percent  on  average.  Line  A in Figure 
1 (the  solid line)  reflects  the  assumption  of expected 
long-term  price  stability.  (The  yield  gap  between 
nonindexed  and  indexed  bonds  is zero.  The  current 
value  of the  price  index  is taken  to  be  100.)  Figure 
2 displays  the  term  structure  of real  yields  inferred 
from  indexed  bond  yields  of  successively  longer 
maturity.  Initially,  I assume  that  the yields  on indexed 
bonds  indicate  that  the  public  believes  real yields  will 
remain  at  3 percent.  Line  1 in  Figure  2  (the  solid 
line)  reflects  this  assumption. 
Finally,  I  assume  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  real 
GNP  has declined  relative  to what  the  Fed  considers 
a sustainable  rate.  In response,  the  Fed  has over  time 
gradually  worked  the  funds  rate  down  (by  lowering 
its borrowed  reserves  target  or by  reducing  the  dis- 
count  rate).  At some  point,  a rise  in long-term  bond 
rates  follows  a reduction  in the  funds  rate.  The  Fed 
then  must  decide  whether  this rise should  deter  future 
funds  rate  reductions.  The  Fed  will  be  concerned 
that  the  rise in bond  rates  signals  the  market’s  belief 
that  it is willing  to  tolerate  a higher  inflation  rate.  In 
this  situation,  a yield  gap  indicator  would  help  the 
Fed  understand  the  cause  of the  rise  in bond  rates. 
Consider  the  following  possibilities. 
I.  The  measure  of  the  public’s  expectation  of  in- 
flation  remains  unchanged.  That  is,  line  A  in 
Figure  1 continues  to  measure  the  future  profile 
of the  price  level  expected  by  the  public.  Bond 
yields  have  risen  because  real  yields  have  risen. 
Figure  1 
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Note:  Time  profile  of  the  future  price  level  expected  by  the  public 
(PF)  inferred  from  the  yield  gap  between  nonindexed  and 
indexed  bonds  of  successively  longer  maturities. 
A.  Line  2  in  Figure  2  shows  a  first  possible 
case.  It  shows  real  yields  rising  at  all  but 
the  very  shortest  maturities.  (Yields  on  the 
shortest  maturities  are  tied  down  by  the 
current  value  of  the  funds  rate.)  This  evi- 
dence  suggests  that  the  economy  has  begun 
to  strengthen.  It  favors  prompt  action  to 
reverse  the  recent  reduction  in  the  funds 
rate. 
B.  Line  3  in  Figure  2  shows  a  second  case. 
It  shows  real  yields  rising  only  in the  future. 
Figure  2 
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Note:  Term  structure  of  the  real  rate  of  interest  (rr)  inferred  from 
yields  on  indexed  bonds  of  successively  longer  maturities. 
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pants  expect  a  rise  in  real  rates  in  the 
future,  perhaps  because  of  an  optimistic 
assessment  of prospects  for  a future  revival 
of economic  activity.  This  evidence  suggests 
ceasing  actions  that  lower  the  funds  rate,  but 
delaying  actions  to raise it. In this latter  case, 
the  delayed  rise  in  the  real  rate  could  also 
reflect  the  market’s  belief  that  the  Fed  will 
be reluctant  initially  to let  short-term  market 
rates  rise  in response  to  stronger  economic 
activity.  Such  a  belief,  however,  would 
appear  unlikely  because  of  the  assumption 
of an unchanged  expectation  of inflation  (an 
absence  of movement  in line A in Figure  1). 
II.  A  second  possibility  is  that  bond  yields  have 
risen  because  the  public  now  expects  positive 
inflation  to  replace  price  stability. 
A.  In  the  first  case  considered,  line  A changes 
to  line  B  in  Figure  1.  As  depicted  by  line 
B,  the  public  now  believes  that  the  Fed 
will  maintain  an  unchanged  price  level  in 
the  long  term,  but  that  the  near-term 
inflation  rate  will  be  positive.  If  real  yields 
have  remained  unchanged  (line  1  is  un- 
changed  in  Figure  ‘Z), then  it  is  likely  that 
market  participants  expect  some  transitory 
increase  in  inflation  unrelated  to  monetary 
policy.  In  this  case,  the  Fed  is  likely  to 
B. 
postpone  further  policy  actions  that  would 
reduce  the  funds  rate. 
In  the  second  case,  the  rise  in  bonds  rates 
is accompanied  by  a change  in the  expected 
future  price  profile  from  line  A to  line  C  in 
Figure  1.  If,  at  the  same  time,  real  yields 
rise  (line  1 in  Figure  2  changes  to  line  Z), 
it is likely  that  the  market  believes  that  Fed 
easing  has  gone  too  far.  It  believes  that  the 
cumulative  reduction  in the funds  rate will not 
only  stimulate  economic  activity,  but  also will 
create  inflation.  This  information  is  likely 
to  induce  the  Fed  to  reverse  its most  recent 
action  reducing  the  funds  rate. 
A third  case  is illustrated  by the  combination 
of  movement  to  line  C  in  Figure  1  and 
line 4 in Figure  2. This  combination  suggests 
that  market  participants  have  become  con- 
cerned  that  monetary  policy  will  become 
inflationary  in  the  future,  but  real  rates  are 
falling  in  the  climate  of  weakness  in  eco- 
nomic  activity.  This  information  suggests 
that  the  Fed  should  continue  to  reduce  the 
funds  rate,  but  reaffirm  its  commitment  to 
maintaining  price  stability.  For  example, 
the  Fed  could  communicate  to  the  public 
the  level  of  future  inflation  it  considers 
acceptable  by  specifying  an  explicit  target 
path  for  the  future  price  level. 
ENDNOTES 
’ See  Hetzel  (1990  and  1991)  and  Bondweek  (1991).  The  idea 
of  indexed  bonds  is  an  old  one.  In  his  Rmim  article,  “The 
Concept  of Indexation  in  the  History  of  Economic  Thought,” 
Humphrey  (1974)  lists  a  number  of  early  economists  who 
advocated  indexed  bonds:  John  Maynard  Keynes  in  1924; 
George  Bach  and  Richard  Musgrave  in  194 1; and  Milton  Fried- 
man  in  1951.  Humphrey  also  notes  two  early  examples  of 
indexed  bonds.  .During  the  American  Revolution,  the  Massa- 
chusetts  legislature  issued  bonds  with  interest  and  principal  tied 
to  an  index  of  the  prices  of  staple  commodities.  In  1925  the 
Rand  Kardex  Co.,  at the  urging  of Irving  Fisher,  issued  a 30-year 
bond  indexed  to  the  wholesale  price  index.  In  1985,  Senators 
Quayle  and  Trible  introduced  a bill to index  government  bonds 
(S.  1088,  the  “Price  Indexed  Bonds  Act  of  1985”)  and  Repre- 
sentative  Lungren  introduced  a similar  bill in the  House  (H.R. 
1773,  “The  Price  Indexed  Bonds  Act  of  1985”).  See  the  U.S. 
Congress  (1985)  Hearings,  “Inflation  Indexing  of Government 
Securities.” 
2 The  bonds  would  be  issued  and  retired  just  after  the  middle 
of  the  month,  when  the  CPI  is  announced  for  the  preceding 
month.  The  dollar principal  payment  on an indexed  bond  would 
then  be  increased  by  the  percentage  increase  in  the  CPI  from 
the  month  preceding  its  issue  to  the  month  preceding  its 
redemption.  Zero-coupon  bonds  avoid  problems  of  how  to 
index  partially  accrued  coupon  payments  when  a bond  is traded 
before  maturity. 
3 Forward  rates  for individual  years  would  be  inferred  under  the 
assumption  that  the  yield  over the  life of the  bond  is a geometric 
average  of  the  yields  over  the  successive  individual  years. 
4 The  issue  of  how  to  tax  capital  gains  is  perennially  con- 
tentious.  There  is a consensus  among  economists,  however,  that 
taxing  capital  gains  representing  only  paper  gains  that  compen- 
sate  for  inflation  distorts  investment  and  savings  decisions 
undesirably. 
5 Woodward  has  published  a series  on the  real yield  on indexed 
bonds  and  on the  implied  expected  inflation  rate.  A key  feature 
of  his  series  is  an  adjustment  for  different  tax  treatment  of 
nonindexed  and  indexed  gilts.  In  Britain,  holders  of  indexed 
bonds  do not  pay  taxes  on that  part  of the  income  due  to capital 
appreciation,  while  holders  of nonindexed  bonds  pay  taxes  on 
the  inflation  premium  built  into  interest  payments.  This  differ- 
ence  in  tax  treatment  increases  the  size  of  the  yield  gap  be- 
tween  the  two  kinds  of bonds  beyond  bondholders’  expectation 
of inflation.  Woodward  reduces  the  gap by the  estimated  amount 
due  to  this  tax  effect.  Subtracting  this  reduced  difference  from 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  21 the  yield  on  nonindexed  bonds  gives  a tax-adjusted  real  yield 
series.  That  is, it provides  a measure  of the  real yield that  holders 
of indexed  bonds  would  receive  in the  absence  of favorable  tax 
treatment. 
6 Treasury  opposition  to the  issue of indexed  bonds  also appears 
to  reflect  a general  hesitation  to  innovate  in debt  management 
techniques.  “A  poorly  received  Treasury  issue,  because  of 
faulty  design  or  a misreading  of a new  potential  market,  could 
adversely  affect  Treasury’s  credibility  in  the  market.  So  we 
approach  innovation  with  great  care”  (U.S.  Congress,  1985, 
p.  20). 
7 Mr.  Cavanaugh  actually  expressed  both  the  concern  that  there 
would  be  no  demand  for  indexed  bonds  and  that  there  would 
be  too  much  demand.  In  the  latter  case,  their  issue  would  be 
a problem  because  they  would  compete  with  S&Ls  for  funds 
(U.S.  Congress,  p.  23).  It is hard  to  know  what  to  make  of the 
assertion  that  the  market  for  indexed  bonds  would  be  illiquid. 
If dealers  in government  securities  find  it profitable  to sell con- 
ventional  debt,  why  would  they  not  find  it profitable  also to  sell 
indexed  debt? 
8 Munnell  and  Grolnic  (1986,  pp.  4,s)  note,  “Anyone  saving for 
a specific  goal,  such  as purchasing  a house  or  sending  children 
to college,  should  welcome  the  opportunity  to ensure  that  such 
savings  will  not  be  eroded  by  inflation.  .  .  . Moreover,  in  the 
United  States  there  may  well  be  a  niche  for  index  bonds  that 
has not  been  adequately  explored-namely,  the  financing  of fully 
indexed  annuities  for  retirees.  These  annuities  could  play  an 
important  role  in protecting  elderly  people  against  the  erosion 
of  their  pension  income  during  their  retirement  years.” 
Munnell  and  Grolnic  then  document  that  pension  .plans  have 
not  historically  adjusted  payments  to  beneficiaries  to  compen- 
sate  fully  for  inflation. 
They  also  note  that  there  are  no  financial  instruments  that 
can  satisfactorily  protect  purchasing  power  against  inflation. 
“Common  stocks  .  .  .  seem  to  be  a  particularly  unsuitable 
investment  for  producing  a stable  real  income.  While  over  the 
past  30  years  stocks  have  provided  a high  average  real  return, 
this  return  has been  so volatile  that  investors  have  experienced 
significant  periods  of  negative  real  earnings.  Long-term  bonds 
have fared  even  less well: their  average  real return  has been  near 
zero  and  in recent  years  the  variability  has been  almost  as great 
as that  for  common  stocks.  Treasury  bills  do  appear  to  offer  a 
stable  real positive  return,  but  this  return  is very  low  and  these 
instruments  are  a  less  than  perfect  hedge  against  inflation” 
(Munnell  and  Grolnic,  1986,  p.  18). 
9 An  eight-month  lag  was  adopted  to  simplify  calculation  of 
accrued  interest  on  bonds  with  semi-annual  coupon  payments. 
With  the  eight-month  lag, immediately  after  a coupon  payment, 
assuming  the  most  recently  available  price  index  is  for  two 
months  in the  past,  one  can  calculate  the  indexed  value  of the 
coupon  payment  six  months  in  the  future. 
lo The  Bank  of England  supplied  the  author  with  data  on  out- 
standing  debt  by maturity  for both  nonindexed  and indexed  debt. 
The  yield  gap  between  nonindexed  and  indexed  debt  did 
indeed  influence  relative  supplies  of  the  two  kinds  of  debt. 
Relative  supplies,  however,  did not appear  to influence  the  subse- 
quent  yield  gap. 
ii  Data  for expected  inflation  were  supplied  by Thomas  Wood- 
ward.  They  are derived  from the yield  gap between  conventional 
and  indexed  bonds  after an adjustment  for the favorable  tax treat- 
ment  of indexed  bonds.  See  endnote  5 and  Woodward  (1990). 
12  In  1990,  expected  inflation  measured  by  the  yield  gap  rose 
to  about  6  percent,  which  was  higher  than  the  trend  rate  of 
German  inflation.  Investors  in British  bonds  may  have  believed 
that  Britain  would  abandon  the  3-to-1  DMIf  exchange  rate  to 
avoid  the  costs  of  a  severe  disinflation.  They  may  also  have 
believed  that  the  trend  rate  of  German  inflation  would  rise 
because  of  fiscal  pressures  from  German  reunification. 
13  The  DMIf  exchange  rate  began  to  fall  in  1989.  This  fall 
indicated  that  the  terms  of  trade  were  no  longer  appreciating 
in  Britain’s  favor.  A  pegged  exchange  rate  then  required  a 
convergence  of  British  and  German  rates  of  inflation.  This 
convergence  in  inflation  rates  required  a  drastic  monetary 
deceleration  in Britain.  In  1989 and the first part  of 1990,  growth 
in  the  broad  monetary  aggregate  M4  was  around  20  percent, 
while  growth  in the  monetary  base  MO was  around  8 percent. 
By autumn  199 1, M4  growth  had fallen to around  8 percent  and 
MO growth  had  fallen  to  around  2  percent. 
I4 See  De  Kock  (1991).  De  Kock  supports  the  first  assertion 
by  pointing  to  the  absence  of  a negative  relationship  between 
the  yield  on  indexed  bonds  and  future  changes  in  economic 
activity.  Economic  theory,  however,  does  not  predict  a negative 
(or  any  predictable)  relationship  between  these  two  variables. 
In  fact,  in  any  macroeconomic  model,  the  sign  of  the  corre- 
lation  between  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  future  economic 
activity  depends  upon  the  kind  of  shock  impinging  upon  the 
economy.  In  a standard  IS-LM  model,  for example,  a positive 
real  sector  shock  (rightward  shift  in the  IS  schedule)  will  lead 
to  a /rig/zw real  rate  of  interest  and  a /zig/zer  level  of  real  GNP. 
The  author’s  rationale  for  his  test  appears  to  rely  on  the 
assumption  that  a  rise  in  interest  rates  necessarily  reflects  a 
tightening  of monetary  policy,  and  conversely.  For  example,  he 
argues  that  the  yield  gap  could  not  have  been  an  adequate 
measure  of inflation  expectations  in Britain  in the  period  from 
early  1988 through  mid-1990.  Over  this period,  long-term  market 
rates  rose  (monetary  policy  was tightened  according  to De  Kock) 
and  expected  inflation  (measured  by  the  yield  gap)  rose,  rather 
than  fell.  Measured  by  growth  of  the  monetary  aggregates, 
however,  monetary  policy  was  expansionary.  Growth  in  the 
monetary  aggregates  MO  and  M4  was  quite  rapid.  Monetary 
deceleration  did  not  begin  until  mid-1990.  Market  rates  could 
have  risen  because  expected  inflation  rose. 
is The  favorable  tax treatment  accorded  indexed  bonds  widens 
the  size  of the  yield  gap.  Because  the  author  fails to correct  for 
this tax effect,  he concludes  that  the yield gap is a biased  measure 
of inflation.  That  is, he finds  that  the  yield  gap,  which  includes 
a tax effect,  consistently  overpredicts  inflation.  Also,  the  author 
uses  a theoretically  unsatisfactory  measure  of inflation.  He  uses 
the  retail  price  index  that  includes  mortgage  interest  payments. 
It  would  have  been  better  to  use  the  retail  price  index  that 
excludes  these  payments. 
I6 In a personal  communication  to the  author,  Milton  Friedman 
argued  for using  the  yield  gap  as a turget.  He  would  instruct  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  eliminate  the  gap  over  time. 
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